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Abstract. In recent years, many physicists have used evolutionary game theory
combined with a complex systems perspective in an attempt to understand social
phenomena and challenges. Prominent among such phenomena is the issue of the 
emergence and sustainability of cooperation in a networked world of selfish or self-
focused individuals. The vast majority of research done by physicists on these 
questions is theoretical, and is almost always posed in terms of agent-based models.
Unfortunately, more often than not such models ignore a number of facts that are 
well established experimentally, and are thus rendered irrelevant to actual social
applications. I here summarize some of the facts that any realistic model should
incorporate and take into account, discuss important aspects underlying the relation 
between theory and experiments, and discuss future directions for research based on
the available experimental knowledge.
Keywords: Complex systems, evolutionary game theory, cooperation, behavioral
experiments.
1. Introduction: Physics and the social sciences
While the idea of applying physics methods to social phenomena goes back some two
hundred years (see [1] and references therein), the coming of age of statistical physics
as the proper description of complex systems has stimulated a rapid development of the
field in the last two decades. Physics journals are now populated by thousands of models
that aim to describe this, that and the other in socio-economic phenomenology. Just
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as an example, the review Statistical physics of social dynamics [2], published in 2009,
contains hundreds of references to papers in this area, and many more have appeared
in subsequent years. Unfortunately, in contrast to biology, where physicists work very
often hand in hand with biologists and, in particular, with experimental biologists, those
papers are quite far from applicable in the social sciences. Quoting Castellano et al.:
The introduction of a profusion of theoretical models has been mainly justified
by vague plausibility arguments, with no direct connection to measurable facts.
Very little attention has been paid to a stringent quantitative validation of
models and theoretical results. The contribution of physicists in establishing
social dynamics as a sound discipline grounded on empirical evidence has been
so far insufficient.
Subsequent work does not seem to have taken care of this problem. The amount of 
theoretical knowledge accumulated by physicists is already enough to be collected in 
textbooks such as [3], but it still criticized from the social sciences camp for its 
obliviousness to their contributions [4]. In this mini-review I point out to one of the 
reasons for the lack of contact between social research done by physicist and real-life 
issues: The fact that empirical and experimental knowledge is rarely incorporated into 
models. However, a remark is in order before going into this discussion. There are two 
bona fide motives to study a model of cooperation from the physics viewpoint: exploring 
and explaining real observations of cooperation (the one that this paper deals with) and 
studying novel statistical mechanics in the sense of e.g., finding new universality classes 
with consequences at the collective behavior level. “Classical” or “canonical” models, 
such as the voter [5], Schelling [6] or Axelrod [7] models are good examples of papers on 
physically interesting research that hints on actual social phenomena (see also [2]). Thus, 
a model that has no direct connection with social phenomena may still be interesting but, 
clearly, only a minority of the “profusion of theoretical models” mentioned above falls in 
this class. For the rest, lacking theoretical relevance, only their relation to actually 
observed features of cooperation may make them appealing to the social science 
community at large.
2. Physics of cooperation
As an appropriate example of the shortcomings of this research, I will focus below on the 
issue of the emergence and sustainability of cooperation. Why individuals cooperate with 
their conspecifics is a general puzzle of evolution, in so far as helping others diminishes the 
chances to transmit one’s genes to the next generation. This is the case with all living 
beings, from virus and bacteria [8] to humans [9] through insects [10]. In our case, humans 
are considered to be hyper cooperative, i.e., we cooperate to a much larger extent than 
our relatives, the great apes [11], leading to our unusual cognition, technology and culture 
[12]. Therefore, it is no surprise that the questions as to how cooperation arises and 
survives has attracted the interest of researchers in many
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fields, from economics (e.g., [13] to biology [14], and of course, of many physicists (who 
sometimes make the mistake of neglecting contributions from other fields [15]). Thus, a 
very recent review paper [16] on the statistical physics of human cooperation features 295 
references, in what is very likely a lower bound on the number of papers dealing with this 
problem.
Much of the research on the evolution of cooperation relies on evolutionary game 
theory [9, 17, 18] and, in particular, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and related games [19]. 
In this stylization of the difficulties arising in cooperation, two people have to decide 
whether they want to cooperate with the other or not. Mutual cooperation provides both 
of them with a benefit, but it is more convenient not to cooperate, so one benefits from 
the other’s cooperation at no personal cost. Thus, the best option is skip cooperation, 
but when both agents think in this manner and choose this option no benefit is produced 
and they turn out worse than if they had both cooperated, hence the dilemma. It is 
clear that this is an abstract but faithful representation of the puzzle of cooperation and, 
as such, has been studied at great length. To add evolution to this game-theoretical 
setup, a population of agents is considered: these agents are endowed with a strategy, 
i.e., a recipe to decide whether to cooperate or to defect, and interact repeatedly among 
themselves. Those who benefited more from the interaction are more likely to reproduce 
and be represented in the next generation, the specific rule governing reproduction being 
one of the model ingredients.
It is probably fair to say that the pioneering paper of this research was the one on 
evolutionary games and spatial chaos by Nowak and Sigmund [20]. This was a cellular 
automata model [21] intended to explore nontrivial dynamics of spatially extended 
systems in physics and biology but, as a side result, showed that cooperation could 
survive when agents were located on the nodes of a square lattice and interacted only 
with their neighbors. This result spawned many other works dealing with evolutionary 
game theory on graphs [22] and also led to the general belief that cooperation was 
promoted by the existence of a (lattice or network) structure on the population. 
However, it was later shown [18] that this was by no means a general result, and 
the survival of cooperation depended on the model details: The composition of the 
population in terms of the strategies present, the initial conditions, the reproduction 
rules, the population structure and its details (particularly when considering networks), 
etc. In such an unclear scenario, more and more models were proposed “justified by 
vague plausibility arguments”, and almost no research tried to make a connection with 
reality. A reality which, as always in physics, eventually comes down to empirically 
established facts through experiments.
3. Cooperation on structured populations: empirical facts
Indeed, one particularly relevant source of information for research on cooperation 
(and on any social interaction, for that matter) is behavioral economics [23]. This 
discipline, that became accepted as mainstream economics with the award of the Nobel
Physics of human cooperation: Experimental evidence and theoretical models 4
Memorial Prize in Economics to Kahneman and Smith in 2002, is the equivalent 
to physics experiments as far as validation of game-theoretical models is concerned. 
What researchers typically do is to recruit a number of subjects (more often than not, 
university undergraduate students) that are asked to play the game of interest (in an 
anonymous setting to avoid confounding influences) and monetarily rewarded according 
to everybody’s decisions during the experiment. Arguably, this is a highly idealized 
version of real life interactions but, on the other hand, the same could be said of a 
majority of physics experiments that are carried out in laboratory setups. In fact, it is 
sometimes possible to take these experiments to more realistic contexts [24], although 
the logistic difficulties are considerable and sometimes unsurmountable.
Within behavioral economics, the issue of cooperation on structured populations 
has been considered both by economists [25, 26] and by others [27–31]. A disclaimer is 
in order here as to the extent of the literature on this field: Research on cooperation 
is practically ubiquitous and appears in fields ranging from psychology to computer 
science, and it is a herculean task to follow all these many venues, so this list should 
probably be complemented with some other papers. Even with this caveat in mind, 
from the experiments the following conclusions regarding empirical facts can be drawn:
Lattices or networks do not support cooperation. With the exception of [31], most papers 
[25–30] find that cooperation starts at a high level, with more than half the agents in the 
population choosing to cooperate, and proceeds from there to a more or less slow decline 
towards a small (around 20% or less) fraction of cooperating agents. This is in fact the 
general behavior observed in the general class of games known as “public goods 
games” (see [32] for a review). Regarding the experiments in [31], they address the claim 
that when the ratio between the benefit of cooperation and the cost of cooperating 
exceeds the number of neighbors, cooperation should be supported. This typically means 
that the cost of cooperation is very small and the other quoted papers are in the opposite 
regime, which would explain the negative result. On the other hand, when cooperation is 
cheap, it is clear that it will also be easier to maintain. However, the experiment in [31] is 
problematic on its own, because different replications (in the lab and using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers) of the experiment reported in the paper yield widely different 
results (80% vs 40% cooperation), and because the fraction of cooperation is not 
monotonic on the control parameter, contrary to the predictions. These and other issues, 
such as the short duration of the experiment compared to others, which would warrant a 
much longer discussion, cast some doubt on this result, although of course it has to be 
kept in mind as we will come back to later.
People are moody conditional cooperators. Conditional cooperation refers to a strategy 
that is more likely to cooperate when more neighbors around cooperated with oneself, 
and was discovered in [33] in the context of unstructured group interactions. For 
structured populations, it was found in [27], where it was also discovered that the 
previous action of the subject also conditioned her choices, being more likely to cooperate
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after having cooperated and vice versa. This was further confirmed in the experiments 
[29, 30, 34, 35]. Interestingly, when one assumes that this is the way people choose their 
actions when playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma on a structured population, it has been 
theoretically shown that the behavior of cooperation does not depend on the structure 
considered [36], which would indicate that lattices or networks are no different from an 
unstructured population in agreement with the experimental observations [29].
People do not take into account the earnings of their neighbors. This is a result arising 
from the meta-analysis of three different experiments in [30], and it implies that the 
experimental subjects take their decisions based on actions only (according to a moody 
conditionally cooperative strategy as described in the previous paragraph) and, perhaps, 
on their own benefit of the interaction. This is a very important finding: Indeed, many 
evolutionary models assume that agents that obtain more benefit from the interaction 
are more represented in the next generation. This might very well be the case in other 
living beings (such as bacteria, for instance [8]) but our result for humans goes against 
the applicability of this kind of updating to describe human social phenomena. This 
is also in agreement with the intuition that when we cooperate with others, we know what 
others did to us (cooperate or not) but we are generally unaware of the specific benefit 
they reaped from the interaction. In this respect, it is important to note that people still 
may be mimicking others, i.e., copying their actions, but they choose which action to 
copy based on criteria that do not involve the payoffs others obtain with their choices. 
Thus, forms of conditional cooperation may arise from copying the action of the majority, 
or from choosing to cooperate with probability proportional to the number of cooperating 
neighbors, but in none of these the payoff of the others is considered.
Cooperation can be sustained in dynamic networks. When, instead of playing with 
fixed neighbors on some structure, subjects are allowed to modify their network at 
will (unrestrictedly or with certain constraints), cooperation is promoted, and stable 
fractions of cooperators can be 60% or above [37–44]. In essence, this is nothing 
but assortment, i.e., the facts that cooperators get together to benefit each other, 
leaving out those that defected. This was proposed as the true and only ultimate 
reason supporting cooperation in [45], which would translate into different proximate 
mechanisms of social relationship. In the case of cooperation on structured populations, 
it appears that information on the others’ behavior (but, again, not on their benefits) or, 
in other words, reputation, is the mediator for the choices of whom to connect to [40], 
although it has been found in more elaborate cooperation games that reputation does not 
always help [46]. Interestingly, the mechanism underlying the stability of cooperation in 
dynamic networks may be more general, as it can be interpreted as punishment: When 
my neighbor defects and benefits from my cooperative action, I punish her by cutting the 
corresponding link and abstaining from interacting. Such behavior is indeed related to the 
punishment that has been observed to sustain and even increase cooperation in public 
goods games; in this case, players are allowed to pay to have money taken from
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others [47] which is a similar manner to inflict an economic damage to one’s counterparts. 
Conditional cooperation might be also interpreted as a manner of punishment in this 
context. For dynamic networks, thinking in terms of punishment would also explain the 
relevance of the past history or reputation in order to decide on which links to cut. 
Interestingly, this interpretation agrees with the theoretical results in [48], where the 
importance of credible, player-specific punishment to support collaboration on networks 
is highlighted.
Having summarized the facts we have learned about cooperation on structured 
populations, a word is in order to discuss how they apply to real life and to models. My 
contention in this paper is that models are accepted (always provisionally) or rejected 
based on the results of experiments. To that end, as in physics, experiments are designed 
and carried out trying to falsify the predictions of a model and, as such, they should be as 
close to it as possible. One obvious physical example is the research done with the LHC at 
CERN, far from any real life situation, but in spite of that it is the ultimate test of any 
high-energy physics theory. Then, it may turn out that the model predictions are true as 
in the claim above, but it also occurs (and very often) that the model predictions are 
wrong: For instance, there are tenths of theoretical papers claiming that scale-free 
networks should give rise to large values of cooperation, but the available experimental 
evidence, albeit scarce, does not support this claim. This is so because, contrary to the 
comment above, people do not necessarily behave in a self-centered or selfish manner, and 
therefore the outcome of an experiment is more often than not surprising even to the 
experimenter.
In fact, once a the mechanism considered in a model has been experimentally 
demonstrated, the next question is then whether or not it applies in real life. Here it is 
important to consider the differences between models and real human behavior. One such 
difference is that many models consider agents that choose their actions in the game 
without taking into account that it will be repeated. Indeed, a rational player interested 
only in maximizing her own monetary payoff should play according to the game 
theoretical concept of Nash equilibrium [49] when the game is played only once: In one-
shot Prisoner’s Dilemmas, for instance, this corresponds to defection. However, when the 
game is repeated an infinite number of times or players do not know the exact number of 
rounds to be played many equilibria (including some cooperative ones) are possible 
[17,50]. A related issue is the fact that people recognized that they are playing with the 
same counterparts and that they may punish them as discussed above, even at a personal 
cost, to ensure cooperation in the future, something that relies on a theory of mind [51] 
that agents in most models do not have. Experiments are, therefore, key to understand 
this type of problems as they are done with real people that may not behave like the 
agents featured in the models, but their results have to be interpreted in the light of such 
dissimilarities.
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4. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have seen that there are many relevant experimental results 
on cooperation on structured populations published in widely read journals while, 
unfortunately, many models are introduced in the literature without taking into account 
the facts established above. As physicists, we learned that knowledge only advances 
when theory and experiment go hand in hand, feeding back on each other. In the case 
of the physics of human cooperation, we are at the stage that only models which are 
compatible with the known facts should be studied and published, and this is certainly 
not the case. To be sure, I stress that I am discussing human cooperation here; there 
are many other applications, from bacteria to bots, where models that do not abide by 
the empirical facts summarized above may be correct descriptions of the real world.
Having said this, it appears that there are two main directions for research starting 
from the empirical facts. An important one is to clarify the possible dependence of the 
emergence of cooperation on the parameters of the game, as claimed in [31]. In this 
respect, further experimental research is needed. One important concern at this point is 
the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers as experimental subjects: the fact that a 
pool of some 30 000 turkers takes part in more than 1000 experiments per year [52] and 
that their behavior depends on many external factors such as the time of the day [53] is 
certainly problematic. As in any other experimental field in the social sciences, 
replications are badly needed [54, 55] (sadly, reproducibility is also an issue in better 
established fields, such as, e.g., cancer research [56] where initiatives to solve this problem 
are underway [57]); similar efforts would be important for a better understanding of 
cooperation. On the other hand, international collaborations that allow to compare the 
behavior of people from largely different backgrounds are also indispensable to assess the 
generality of the results. The second direction in which research would contribute to 
advance the field is theoretical: Models incorporating the empirical facts and otherwise 
being specific on other aspects of behavior (such as, for instance, dependence on social 
characteristics of the participants [58]) should be developed to gain further insight on the 
interplay between social structure and cooperation. Their predictions could then be 
tested on new experiments specifically designed to that end, thus establishing further 
empirical facts. A very interesting issue is that of system size: It is quite obvious that a 
system with a few people may behave very differently from a system with thousands of 
interacting agents. One, but not the only reason for that could be the amount of 
information one has to process in a very large system as compared to a small one. The 
very physical issues of scaling (such as the growth of the number of possible equilibria 
with the system size [48]) and phase transitions will surely play a role in such research. 
Progress in these and related directions can only be achieved by the judicious 
combination of theoretical and experimental efforts, which I hope will be stimulated by 
this mini-review.
Physics of human cooperation: Experimental evidence and theoretical models 8
Acknowledgments
I am most grateful to all my collaborators in the experiments I have participated in since
my first one [27]. I have learned a lot from and with them, from the experimental design
phase to the analysis of the resulting data. This work was partially supported by the
EU through FET-Proactive Project DOLFINS (contract no. 640772) and FET-Open
Project IBSEN (contract no. 662725), and by Ministerio de Economa y Competitividad
(Spain)/FEDER (EU) grant VARIANCE (contract no. FIS2015-64349-P). Project
IBSEN is in fact about large-scale experiments and provides a open-access platform
for researchers to carry out them [59].
References
[1] Stauffer D 2012 J. Stat. Phys 151 9–20
[2] Castellano C, Fortunato S and Loreto V 2009 Rev. Mod. Phys. 81 591–646
[3] Sen P and Chakrabarti B K 2013 Sociophysics: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
[4] Troitsch K G 2014 J. Artif. Soc. Social Simulation 17 issue 1
[5] Clifford P and Sudbury A 1973 Biometrika 60, 581–588
[6] Schelling T C 1971 J. Math. Soc. 1 143-186
[7] Axelrod R 1997 J. Conflict Resol. 41, 203–226
[8] Wingreen N S and Levin S A 2006 PLOS Biol. 4 e299
[9] Axelrod R 1984 The evolution of cooperation (New York: Basic Books)
[10] Wilson E O 2000 Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition (Cambridge:
Belknap Press)
[11] Cronin K A 2012 Anim. Behav. 84 1085–93
[12] Tomasello M and Vaish A 2013 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 64 231–55
[13] Bowles S and Gintis H 2011 A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its Evolution
(Princeton: Princeton University Press)
[14] Wilson E O 2000 Sociobology (25th Anniversary Edition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press)
[15] Durlauf S N 1999 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 10582–10584
[16] Perc M, Jordan J J, Rand D G, Wang Z, Boccaletti S and Szolnoki A 2017 Phys. Rep. 687 1–51
[17] Gintis H 2009 Game Theory Evolving, 2nd Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
[18] Roca C P, Cuesta J A and Sa´nchez A 2009 Phys. Life Rev. 6 208–49
[19] Rapoport A and Chammah A M 1965 Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press)
[20] Nowak M A and Sigmund K 1992 Nature 355 250–53
[21] Wolfram S 1983 Rev. Mod. Phys. 55 601–44
[22] Szabo´ G and Fa´th G 2007 Phys. Rep. 446 97–218
[23] Camerer C F 2003 Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton:
Princeton University Press)
[24] Sagarra O, Gutie´rrez-Roig M, Bonhoure I, Perello´ J 2016 Front. Phys 3 93
[25] Cassar A 2007 Games Econ. Behav. 58 209–30
[26] Kirchkamp O and Nagel R 2007 Games Econ. Behav. 58 269–92
[27] Grujic´ J, Fosco C, Araujo L, Cuesta J A and Sa´nchez A 2010 PLOS ONE 5 e13749
[28] Traulsen A, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R D, Krambeck H J and Milinski M 2010 Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 107 2962–6
[29] Gracia-La´zaro C, Ferrer A, Ruiz G, Taranco´n A, Cuesta J A, Sa´nchez A and Moreno Y 2012 Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109 12922–6
Physics of human cooperation: Experimental evidence and theoretical models 9
[30] Grujic´ J, Gracia-La´zaro C, Milinski M, Semmann D, Traulsen A, Cuesta J A, Moreno Y and
Sa´nchez A 2014 Sci. Rep. 4 4615
[31] Rand D G, Nowak M A, Fowler J H, Christakis N A 2014 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 111 17093–8
[32] Ledyard, J O 1995 In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J H Kagel and A E
Roth (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
[33] Fischbacher, U, Gaechter S and Fehr E 2001 Econ. Lett. 71 397–404
[34] Gutie´rrez-Roig M, Gracia-Lzaro C, Perell J, Moreno Y and Snchez, A 2014 Nat. Communs. 5,
4362
[35] Horita Y, Takezawa M, Inukai K, Kita T and Masuda N 2017 Sci. Rep. 7 39275
[36] Gracia-La´zaro C, Cuesta J A, Sa´nchez A and Moreno Y 2012 Sci. Rep. 2 325
[37] Ule, A 2008 Partner Choice and Cooperation in Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence
(Berlin: Springer)
[38] Rand D G, Arbesman S and Christakis N A 2011 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108 19193–8
[39] Wang J, Suri S and Watts D J 2012 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109 14363–8
[40] Cuesta J A, Gracia-La´zaro C, Ferrer A, Moreno Y and Sa´nchez A 2015 Sci. Rep. 5 7843
[41] Gallo E and Yan C 2015 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 112 3647–52
[42] Antonioni A, Tomassini M and Sa´nchez A 2015 Sci. Rep. 5 10282
[43] Riedl A, Rohde I M T and Strobel M 2015 Rev. Econ. Studies 83 737–67
[44] Antonioni A, Sa´nchez A and Tomassini M, 2015 Sci. Rep. 6 27160
[45] Fletcher J A and Doebeli M 2009 Proc. R. Soc. B 276 13-19
[46] Corten R, Rosenkranz S, Buskens V and Cook K S 2016 PLOS ONE 7 e0155703
[47] Fehr E and Ga¨chter S 2002 Nature 415 137-140
[48] Dall’Asta L, Marsili M and Pin P 2012 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109, 4395–4400
[49] Nash J F 1950 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36, 48–49
[50] Fudenberg D and Maskin E 1986 Econometrica 54 533–554
[51] Premack D and Woodruff G 1978 Behav. Brain Sci. 4 515–526
[52] Bohannon J 2016 Science 352 1263–4
[53] Arechar A A, Kraft-Todd G and Rand D G 2017 J. Econ. Sci. Assoc. 3 1–11
[54] Aarts A A et al (The Open Science Collaboration) 2015 Science 349 943-951
[55] Camerer C F, Dreber A, Forsell E, Ho T-H, Huber J, Johannesson M, Kirchler M, Almenberg J,
Altmejd A, Chan T, Heikensten E, Holzmeister F, Imai T, Isaksson S, Nave G, Pfeiffer T, Razen
M and Wu H 2016 Science 351 1433–6
[56] Begley C G and Ellis L M 2012 Nature 483 531–533
[57] Baker M and Dolgin E 2017 Nature 541 269–270
[58] Cronin K A and Sa´nchez A 2012 Adv. Complex Sys. 15 Supp no 1 1250066
[59] http://www.ibsen-h2020.eu
